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Abstract
This paper repurposes the classic insight from network theory that long-distance
connections drive disease propagation into a strategy for controlling a second wave
of Covid-19. We simulate a scenario in which a lockdown is first imposed on a
population and then partly lifted while long-range transmission is kept at a mini-
mum. Simulated spreading patterns resemble contemporary distributions of Covid-
19 across EU member states, German and Italian regions, and through New York
City, providing some model validation. Results suggest that our proposed strategy
may significantly flatten a second wave. We also find that post-lockdown flare-ups
remain local longer, aiding geographical containment. Public policy may target long
ties by heavily focusing medical testing and mobility tracking efforts on traffic and
transport. This policy can be communicated to the general public as a simple and
reasonable principle: Stay nearby or get checked.
1 Introduction
Many countries facing the spread of Covid-19 are currently exiting a lockdown regime in
which person-to-person contact was severely restricted. The constraints placed on social
and economic interaction have high cost. How can we intelligently lift these constraints
and open up society now that new infections have dwindled?
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Here we explore the leverage gained from differentiating between short-distance and
long-distance ties in post-lockdown policy. The idea is that the blockage of transmission
through long-distance ties increases the effective diameter of a network, which is inversely
related to the speed of propagation [1, 2]. In practice, such geographic differentiation
may be achieved through location tracking technologies and prioritization of non-local
travel and transport in policy restrictions, enforcement and medical testing. The relative
sparsity of long-range ties may make tight control feasible through a focus of resources
on a small number of key individuals or interactions.
Results show that reductions in transmission through long-range ties slow down Covid-
19 to a much greater extent than reductions in short-range ties. Selective scrutiny of
long-distance ties has two added benefits: Post-lockdown flare-ups of Covid-19 are local,
allowing geographically focused interventions that are of limited economic damage and
logistically more feasible. And social toll is diminished, as the intimacy of human relations
and need for face-to-face contact are known to decrease sharply with geographical distance
[3–9].
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our proposed strategy. In
section 3 we describe our mathematical model and validate it against the data. In section
4 we present the results of model simulations. Section 5 summarizes our findings and
recommendations.
2 Related work
Social network models of disease spreading have been around for decades. What sets
our work apart is an analysis of the epidemiological leverage of government policies that
differentiate long-distance from short-distance ties in social networks.
2.1 Social network models of infectious disease spread
Many epidemiological studies assume random mixing of individuals within demographic
subgroups (e.g. by age) [10, 11]. However, most contact occurs between people who live
very close to one another [12,13]. We draw on the well-known small-world model of Watts
and Strogatz [14] to capture the fundamental difference in viral risk between close-range
and long-range ties: Close-range ties connect infected individuals with others who are
already infected or are about to regardless. Long-range ties expose faraway contacts who
would otherwise not be at risk and who may in turn infect others who are otherwise safe.
The small-world approach to the study of epidemiological dynamics is not new. Net-
work analysis was introduced into mainstream epidemiology at the turn of the century
to explicitly incorporate the contact structure among individuals. It is well known that
diffusion processes on networks depend on the corresponding connectivity patterns [15].
Research has shown that subtle features of network structure can have a major impact on
the outcome of an epidemic [16,17]. Small-world networks are almost identical to lattice
networks in which viruses spread slowly and locally [14, 18]. The subtle difference is a
small portion of ties to distant localities on the lattice, producing a dramatic reduction
in a network’s diameter, which is inversely related to viral spread. The rapid spread of
viruses through small-world networks makes them hard to contain in time within confined
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regions of a population. Past work has examined the effects of a range of network models
on epidemiological dynamics [19–21].
A small-world SEIR model was used in [22] to model an influenza outbreak in the city
of Orhan. In a study closest to ours, Small and Tse investigate disease spread in a small-
world network with separate infection probabilities for short-distance and long-distance
ties [23]. Using a SEIR model of the SARS epidemic dynamics they find that exponential
growth in infection occurs upon onset of several non-local infections. They conclude that
key to capturing the empirically observed transmission dynamics is differentiating local
from non-local transmission probabilities. We build on this observation to explore the
leverage that the targeting of Covid-19 post-lockdown policies at reductions of non-local
transmission may provide to global, national, or regional policy makers.
2.2 Interventions
In epidemiological models effects of both general and targeted interventions on disease
spread have been studied [24]. General interventions such as social distancing and school
closures aim to bring down overall infection probabilities or those within and between de-
mographic subgroups [11]. Targeted interventions seek to identify high-risk individuals:
Antiviral treatment and household isolation of identified cases, prophylaxis and quaran-
tine of household members. We propose a different kind of targeting that is not aimed at
specific nodes but at high-impact edges of a network.
A challenge faced by contemporary policy makers is when and how to ease interven-
tions. How can a second wave be minimized while at the same time preventing enormous
economic costs? It is well known that when a lockdown is lifted, a virus tends to re-
appear [25]. Therefore it is of paramount importance to find ways to regain some form of
normal life (alleviating lockdown) while at the same time preventing the virus from going
viral again. The main idea proposed here is that restricting certain high-risk interactions
within the social network may be a better strategy than to restrict those of an entire
population. ‘Long-distance’ ties represent interaction between individuals that are dis-
tant to each other in a network. Typically this means they are also physically distant, i.e.
think of a truck driver that delivers goods to a company on the other side of the country
or individuals traveling by plane that encounter each other at airports and in airplanes
where social distancing is difficult or next to impossible. Small-world models suggest that
long-distance ties greatly accelerate the speed of transmission. Long-range ties stemming
from infected individuals allow disease to start spreading in distant other localities and
much more often lead to not-yet-infected individuals and regions. At a global level, long
ties predominantly involve international highways and airline transportation. Topological
properties of airline transportation networks can explain patterns in viral disease spread
worldwide [13,26]. At a national level, long ties pertain to mobility through major roads
and trains between cities and at a regional level to commuting and local delivery services.
3
3 Model
3.1 Small World SEIR model
We model the spread of the disease by a small world network, in which each node of the
network is either Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, or Recovered (an SEIR model [22,27]).
In this model, nodes are individuals and we extrapolate our results to large communities
(countries, continents). Initially, a node is in state S. If it is infected, it moves through
states E, I, and R. While in state I, a node may infect each of its neighbors with a
probability r per time step (fixed at one day in our simulations). The duration of state
E is the incubation period, and the duration of state I is the infection period, both
of which are lognormally distributed [28]. The probability r is our single calibration
parameter and all other parameters are fixed according to values that have been reported
in the literature. In our simulations, the incubation period has a mean of 5 days and
the infection time has a mean of 6.5 days, both periods have a standard deviation of 3
days. This is comparable to values reported in [11,29–31]. Each simulation is started by
infecting a single random node (patient zero).
The network in our model is the familiar Watts-Strogatz small world network, which
distinguishes between short and long ties. For purposes of illustration a small example
network with N = 100, k = 20, and p = 0.05 is shown in Figure 1. It allows us to focus
on the ‘stay nearby or get checked’ policy. The network is described by two parameters
k, p, where k is the number of ties per node, which is equal for all nodes, and p is the
fraction of randomly selected long ties. In the simulations we fix N = 10000, k = 20,
and p = 0.1, which is in the standard range [32] and has been used to model an influenza
outbreak in the Oran region of Algeria [22]. Results are robust to reasonable changes in
these parameters.
Figure 1: An example of a Watts-Strogatz small-world graph with N = 100, k = 20 and
p = 0.05.
3.2 Model calibration
We calibrated our model against the number of infections in Wuhan (source: Johns
Hopkins), which went into an initial lockdown from January 23, followed by a heavy
lockdown from February 10 [31]. A substantial number of infections remains undetected
and our simulations are based on the estimate that only ten percent of the infected cases
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are officially confirmed [33]. After an exposed individual becomes infectious, it may take
several days to develop symptoms, and from development of symptoms it takes an average
of 5 days to diagnosis [31]. We use 10 days from becoming infectious to diagnosis. We
calibrated our model parameter r with values 0.055 in the period before lockdown, 0.0065
for the initial lockdown and 0.0012 for the severe lockdown. By using these values, we
were able to reproduce the total number of officially confirmed cases, as demonstrated in
figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Total number of officially confirmed cases (left) and daily number of new cases in the
Hubei area. The shaded part represents the initial lockdown, between Jan 23 and Feb 10. The
spike in new cases on Feb 12 was due to an inclusion of previously uncounted clinically diagnosed
patients. The model data are an average of 200 Monte Carlo simulations.
The reproduction number R0 at the onset of the epidemic is equal to r·k·t in our model.
This value is high at the onset, but reduces already before the initial lockdown due to the
clustered structure of the network. We find an average R0 = 3.9 pre-lockdown, R0 = 0.54
during the initial lockdown and 0.12 during the severe lockdown. These numbers agree
with the statistical analysis in [31].
We fixed r = 0.055 for all simulations of the spread of the disease before lockdown. We
calibrated r after lockdown against the data of several European countries: Italy, Austria,
Sweden, Germany. Italy announced its lockdown relatively late. We used r = 0.01 after
lockdown. We find R0 = 4.0 pre-lockdown, which is marginally higher than the 3.8 found
in [31], and R0 = 0.84 post-lockdown.
Austria implemented a relatively severe lockdown. We found that a parameter value
of r = 0.0055 post-lockdown reproduces the number of confirmed cases.
To verify if the spread of the virus in our network model matches the observed spread
of the disease, we compare our model to data on different scales: countries (American
states, European countries), regions (in Italy and Germany), and cities (New York City
zip codes). We order the data from largest to smallest and normalize by dividing by the
largest number of cases. We find that the spread of the disease in our network model is
comparable to the data.
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Figure 3: The computed reproduction number R0 during the simulation reduces from an initial
7.15 (from r = 0.055, k = 20, t = 6.5) but drops even before the lockdown of January 23. Its
average is 0.54 during the initial lockdown (shaded area) and reduces even further during the
severe lockdown.
Figure 4: Daily number of officially confirmed new cases in Italy (left) with r = 0.01 after
lockdown. Our simulation starts with a single infected node on January 31 and we set the initial
date of the lockdown at March 9, when the government announced nationwide regulations. We
plotted one standard deviation difference in dark green, and a 98 percent confidence interval in
light green around the model data to illustrate the accuracy of our model. We find an average
reproduction number R0 = 4.0 (right) before lockdown and R0 = 0.84 after lockdown.
4 Impact of a stay-nearby-or-get-checked policy
4.1 Peak reduction
As countries get out of lockdown, restrictions are lifted, and the basic reproduction num-
ber will increase, possibly inducing a second wave. Our proposed policy is to control the
long ties to flatten the second wave. To simulate this policy, we use the parameters of
the calibrated model. During an initial lockdown of 785 days, spreading risk is reduced
to r = 0.0075. After lockdown, the parameter is increased to r = 0.02 (requested social
distancing, but no regulations), but some fraction of edges is checked, preventing propa-
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Figure 5: Daily number of officially confirmed new cases in Austria (left) with r = 0.0055 after
lockdown. Our simulation starts with a single infected node on February 22 and a lockdown
at March 15. We find an average reproduction number R0 = 4.2 (right) before lockdown and
R0 = 0.55 after lockdown.
Figure 6: A comparison of the daily number of officially confirmed new cases in ten EU countries
during March and April 2020. The numbers are averaged over six days. In the right hand figure,
this data is adjusted so that the peak of the number of cases occur after 50 days. This is
compared to the 99% confidence band of a model computation with r = 0.055 pre-lockdown and
r = 0.0075 during lockdown. Not all countries fit in the confidence band because their waves
plateaued, while our model shows a sharp peak. The increase and decrease of the wave in our
model does match the data.
gation along those edges. Figure 8 contrasts a scenario in which random edges are checked
(panel A) with one in which only long edges are checked (panel B). Results show that
targeting long edges is efficient. Without intervention a second wave occurs with a peak
several times higher than the first. By targeting long ties, checking 7.5% of ties is suffi-
cient to bring the second peak below the first peak, thereby also delaying its occurrence.
If instead random ties are chosen the second wave peak remains well above the first.
In figure 9 we contrast three post-lockdown strategies for controlling a second wave.
Here we use rshort to denote transmission probabilities on all short ties and and rlong
transmission probabilities on long ties. The first strategy is to not differentiate long ties
from short ties (panel A). Results show that at rlong = rshort = 0.02 (requested social
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Figure 7: Number of confirmed cases on three different scales: USA and Europe – Regione and
Bundesla¨nder – NYC zip codes. The data is ranked from largest to smallest and normalized. On
each scale, the spread of the disease displays a similar exponential decay. The figure also shows
the spatial distribution of Covid-19 spread in our model after 60 days, 25 days into lockdown. To
this end we arbitrarily divided the ring lattice of N = 10,000 nodes into 100 regions of 100 nodes
each. The spatial distribution in our network is comparable to the data of Europe, Germany,
Italy, and New York City. The spread of the disease in the USA is more concentrated, with an
exceptional number of cases in New York and New Jersey.
r intepretation
0.001 Complete lockdown as in Wuhan after February 10th. Fully controlled society.
0.005 Severe lockdown as in Austria. Strong restrictions on travel, shopping, gatherings.
0.01 Moderate regulations and social distancing. As in many EU countries after March 15.
0.02 Requested social distancing, but no regulations.
0.055 Pre-lockdown situation. No social distancing.
(a) Check random edges (b) Check long edges
Figure 8: Peak reduction with baseline r = 0.02 and some edges checked
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distancing without further regulations) the second wave peaks much higher than the first,
and that further regulation is needed to control it.
The second strategy is to open up society back to what it was before the pandemic
(rshort = 0.055), with no social distancing, and then target the 10% of long ties for
checking. Panel B shows various levels of effectiveness in intervening on long ties, varying
rlong. Panel B shows that this strategy only works if disease propagation in long ties
can be fully prevented. In panel C, society is opened back up but social distancing is
requested at an r = 0.02. Now, imperfect checking of long ties rlong = 0.005 can also
accomplish a reduction of the second peak below the first.
(a) Vary rshort and rlong together
(b) Vary rlong, keep rshort = 0.055 (c) Vary rlong, keep rshort = 0.02
Figure 9: Three policy approaches to opening up a lockdown of 75 days, with varying post-
lockdown levels of r: (a) policy does not differentiate long and short ties, (b) policy targets long
ties while all other restrictions are lifted, and (c) policy targets long ties while social distancing
is encouraged.
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4.2 Spatial concentration
Post-lockdown flare-ups are more easily controlled with geographically focused efforts
when they remain local longer. Economic and social costs of control measures are then
also lower. We study the spatial concentration of Covid-19 outbreaks by measuring the
number of components of the subgraph of infected nodes and short edges. Figure 9
compares the spread of the virus for the scenario where rlong = rshort = 0.055 with
the alternative scenario where long-range transmission is maximally repressed, rlong = 0.
The latter scenario is characterized by a smaller number of components during the second
wave. The spread of the virus with rlong = 0 is contained in one region.
Figure 10: Effect of shutting down long-range transmission. From left to right graphs
show disease propagation at 25 day intervals in a small-world network with N = 150,
k = 10 and p = 0.1. All graphs have rshort = 0.055. The top graphs have rlong = 0.055,
while the bottom graphs have rlong = 0. Node color indicates SEIR states, blue =
susceptible, yellow = exposed, red = infectious, black = resistant.
5 Discussion and Policy
In this paper we have through model simulation explored spatially differentiating policies
in which interventions target nonlocal spread of Covid-19. Our results show that reduc-
tions of long-distance transmission are highly efficient for curbing the spread of Covid-19.
The close monitoring and checking of long-distance ties allows overall policy to be more
permissible and still control a second wave. Because flare-ups remain local longer, inter-
ventions can be of limited geographical scope and thus less costly and invasive.
What policies could constrain long-range transmission? Medical testing and mobility-
tracking apps may be targeted specifically at transport, travel, and delivery. Perhaps
medical testing and / or mobility tracking should be encouraged or required for flight,
use of highways, trains, regional bus lines and for individuals with jobs in the transport
and delivery sector. Self-isolation after exposure of such individuals may perhaps be
more stringently enforced. What helps is that long-range ties are relatively sparse, so
resources may be focused on a limited number of individuals or activities. That said, our
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results show that effects are particularly strong when transmission through long-range
ties is not just reduced but largely eliminated. This concords with studies showing that
international traffic constraints are particularly effective when severe [13]. The logistical,
technological and ethical challenges of geographic targeting in location tracking, testing,
and police enforcement require further interdisciplinary study.
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